The RAND Corporation released a report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense that explored the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations.

   The report, titled “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” concluded success on the ground in Afghanistan is directly related to three variables: the governing capability of the state; the ability of local police to provide security; and a lack of external support and sanctuary for insurgents.

   The report states, in its summary, “In many cases, a significant direct intervention by U.S. military forces may undermine popular support and legitimacy.  The United States is also unlikely to remain for the duration of most insurgencies: This study’s assessment of 90 insurgencies indicates that it takes an average of 14-years to defeat insurgents once an insurgency develops.”

   The RAND study defined an insurgency as “a political-military campaign by non-State actors seeking to overthrow a government or secede from a country through the use of unconventional - and sometimes conventional - military strategies and tactics.”

   The author, Seth G. Jones, disclosed his report examined the beginning of the insurgency in Afghanistan – identified as from 2002 until 2008 – and asked three main questions.  First, what was the nature of the insurgency?  Second, what factors have contributed to the rise of insurgencies more broadly and to the insurgency in Afghanistan in particular?  And third, what capabilities should the U.S. military consider developing to improve its ability to wage effective counterinsurgency operations?

The Fallacy of External Actors

   The 117 page, seven chapter report examined 90 insurgencies since World War II and found many policy makers in that time-frame underestimated the value of indigenous players in quelling insurrectionist forces. Indigenous government and security forces are described as “the most critical actor in a counterinsurgency campaign” because most counterinsurgency campaigns are not won or lost by a foreign occupying army.

   Analysis by RAND of all insurgencies since 1945 revealed successful counterinsurgency campaigns lasted an average of 14-years while unsuccessful ones lasted an average of eleven years, with an undisclosed number having ended in a draw.

   Also according to the RAND study, approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and eleven percent by insurgents lasted more than 20-years. American policymakers were warned that until the insurgency was defeated – through successful indigenous efforts – a long-term commitment to Afghanistan will be necessary to prop up the friendly government until victory is achieved. 

   The report warned, “Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so.  If they do not develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends.”

   In an argument against a heavy United States military footprint, the report stated, “…a lead U.S. role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success” and added, “a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they—and not foreign forces—control their destiny.  Competent governments that can provide services to their population in a timely manner can best prevent and overcome insurgencies.”

Indigenous Lead

   Three distinct groups or “actors” comprise an insurgency: insurgents, the government, and outside actors, which may support either insurgents or the government. Although outside actors may play a “pivotal role in tipping the war” in favor of either the insurgents or the government, the report cautioned “outside actors alone can rarely win the war for either side.”

   Indigenous popular support is the goal for all sides in an insurgency because with popular support comes assistance from the local population - money, logistics, recruits, intelligence, and other aid.

   “To many insurgents, the population offers a level playing field.  If insurgents manage to alienate the population from the government and acquire its active support, they are more likely to win the war.  In the end, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population - or, at worst, on its submissiveness,” the RAND report stated.

    RAND concluded, “Most policymakers - including in the United States - repeatedly ignore or underestimate the importance of locals to counterinsurgency warfare.  Counterinsurgency requires not only the capability to conduct unconventional war, but also the capability to shape the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces.”

Past Insurgencies Examined

    Insurgencies Since 1945 Examined by RAND met three criteria to be included in their study: they involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and non-state groups who sought to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence to change government policies; (2) at least 1,000 individuals were killed over the course of the conflict, with a yearly average of at least 100; and (3) at least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).

   Three variables linked with the success or failure of past counterinsurgency efforts were: the capability of local police and security forces; quality of local governance; and external support and sanctuary for insurgents. The ability for local security and police to establish law and order was identified as “paramount” to success.

Law and Order

   Governments with competent security forces won in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies while governments defeated insurgencies less than one-third of the time when their competence was medium or low.

    Characteristics of a competent security force include initiative, good intelligence, motivated soldiers with quality leadership, and the ability to learn and adapt during combat operations.

Low competent organizations were characterized by corruption, along with poorly financed and equipped personnel, and members that are politically divided.

    Governments often relied upon paramilitary forces over local police to engage the insurgency because of the above mentioned superior operational characteristics of security forces compared to local police; however, local police are described by RAND as, “perhaps the most critical component of indigenous forces.”

    On policing, RAND stated, “They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters.  Unlike the military, the police usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these areas; and better intelligence.  This makes them a direct target of insurgent forces, who often try to kill or infiltrate them.”

    An effective police force is critical to fighting an insurgency because there are limits to the use of military force, according to RAND. Because the enemy frequently holds little territory, and when insurgent operations are disturbed by government military operations, insurgents transfer their operations to another area – one absent, or with limited government military capability – leaving the problem of the insurgency “unresolved.”

    “A viable indigenous police force with a permanent presence in urban and rural areas is a critical component of counterinsurgency,” the report concluded on the question as to the importance of a local police force.

    As to how RAND determined competency, a footnote in the report stated that RAND “assessed the capability of government security forces by making a qualitative judgment about how competent their forces were in conducting counterinsurgency warfare.  We tried to avoid the endogeneity problem of coding forces as competent if the government won—and incompetent if they lost.  Rather, we relied on the judgments of area specialists and historians that covered each insurgency.”

Civil Government

    RAND reported the greater the competence level of government in providing its people basic services - the provision of essential services to the population by a legitimate central authority in a timely manner - the greater their ability to undermine support for and defeat insurgents. 

    “The absence of good governance is often a root cause of an insurgency.  A basic need of any insurgent group is an attractive cause,” stated the report.

    The RAND report singled out corruption as a particularly “invidious,” or difficult challenge because it directly undermined the government, hampered economic growth, disproportionately burdened the poor, undermined the rule of law, damaged government legitimacy in the minds of the people, and funneled “scarce public resources” away from projects that benefited society as a whole.

    “However, the most damaging effect of corruption is its impact on the social fabric of society: corruption undermines the population’s trust in the political system, political institutions, and political leadership,” stated the report.

    Cultural realities in Afghanistan present a peculiar challenge for Western governments.  RAND stated, “Afghan territory has historically been controlled by tribes and warlords, and its inhabitants have generally pledged loyalty to those with similar kinship ties and patrilineal descent rather than to the state authority.  Governance problems such as this can often be difficult to fix, especially in the near term.”

External Support

    RAND research disclosed insurgencies that received support from external sources won more than 50 percent of the time, while those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. External support may come in two forms: direct assistance – money, arms, training, logistics, diplomatic backing – and secondly, from the freedom to use foreign territory as sanctuary.

   As is the case currently where Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, the RAND report warned, “…external sanctuary is a significant help to insurgents, often making the difference between their success or failure.  Insurgents have been successful approximately 43 percent of the time when they enjoyed a sanctuary.”

   The report concluded its chapter on research of past insurgencies when it described indigenous forces as the “default force of choice” because “even if tactically successful, a unilateral operation by external forces may ultimately lead to failure by undermining and de-legitimizing the very indigenous capability the external actor is trying to build.”

Afghan Recent History: A Legacy of War

    Chapter three of the RAND report focused on the history of insurgency in Afghanistan.  Afghanistan was ruled by monarchy for over two centuries until 1973 when Mohammed Daoud deposed his brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, and declared Afghanistan a Republic. In 1978, army officers carried out a bloody coup which led to the death of Daoud who was replaced by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was also eventually murdered.

   RAND reported, “Moscow grew increasingly concerned about the deteriorating security situation and feared that Taraki’s successor, Hafizullah Amin, would turn to the West for assistance. Thus began Afghanistan’s age of insurgency.”

The Red Army Fails

   Beginning with the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion, Afghanistan has experienced four major insurgencies: the Mujahideen wars against the Soviet Union (1979–1989); the rise of the Taliban (1994–2001); the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Taliban regime (2001–2002); and the return of the Taliban (2002–present).

   During the fifteen-year Soviet occupation, the Red Army was able to control major cities and provincial towns, however, they were never able to secure and control the countryside. Throughout the occupation by Soviet troops, the situation in the countryside worsened for the Red Army and the Soviet installed Afghan puppet government as the Mujahideen steadily gained popular support.

    Of critical value to the Mujahideen was support from Pakistan in the form of money, weapons and training, and the funneling of aid from United States and Saudi Arabia, among other countries. Pakistan also provided sanctuary to the rebels which kept them safe from attack by Soviet forces.

    “Soviet losses mounted steadily, despite the Soviets’ repeated efforts to defeat the Mujahideen through the widespread deployment of mines, carpet-bombing of rebel areas, and the use of scorched-earth tactics,” RAND reported.

    The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left in its wake an estimated one million dead Afghanis, 15,000 Soviet soldiers killed, with 500,000 sick or wounded.

The Rise of the Taliban

    Pro-Moscow forces clung to power for three-years after the Red Army withdrawal, until 1992, when Kabul fell to Mujahideen forces who established a new government, which lasted until 1994. In late 1994, a new movement named the Taliban – from the plural of Talib, an Arabic word denoting an Islamic student – seized control of Kandahar, in the south.

   Headed by Mullah Omar, the Taliban capitalized on the war weariness of the people and were well received as they promised to be a cleansing force that would rid Afghanistan of factionalism, corruption and violence.

    By February 1995, the Taliban captured nine out of thirty provinces, mainly in the south and east of the country.  In 1996, the Taliban captured the capital city of Kabul, and by 1998, captured and controlled the northern cities of Mazar, Kunduz, and Taloqan. 

    By 2001 the Taliban controlled virtually all of Afghanistan with the only exception being a small sliver of land northeast of Kabul where the Northern Alliance still ruled. With Taliban rule came Shari’a Law, which banned music, women from working or getting an education, and prohibited Freedom of The Press. Also under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became a training ground for Al-Qaeda.

   After the attacks of 9/11, United States and friendly Afghan forces conducted a series of military operations – Operation Enduring Freedom - that put the Taliban on the defensive and ultimately forced them into Pakistan seeking refuge. Beginning in the spring of 2002, Taliban and their allied forces began to conduct offensive operations from bases inside Pakistan - that continue to this day - in an attempt to overthrow the Afghan government and coerce the American forces into leaving.

    Of special note is RAND’s conclusion that Pakistan played a critical role in all recent Afghan insurgencies and will be key in defeating the current insurgency.

    RAND reports, “Pakistan played two particularly important roles.  First, the Pakistan government, especially the ISI, supported the victors of each insurgency: the Mujahideen, Taliban, and U.S. forces during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Since Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,160-mile border, Pakistani leaders have historically viewed the ability to influence Afghanistan as critical for strategic depth.  Second, Afghan insurgent groups have repeatedly used Pakistan as a sanctuary.  These findings have significant implications for understanding the Taliban’s resurgence and assessing how they can be defeated.”

The Taliban Today

    The Taliban have been historically motivated to impose a radical form Sunni Islam in Afghanistan, according to RAND, with their primary strategy to overthrow the Afghan government, and to break the political will of the United States and her coalition partners, thereby forcing all foreign armies to withdraw.

    RAND reports an influx of new fighters recruited at Madrassas and at other locations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  RAND estimated full-time Taliban fighters at several thousand, but acknowledged other estimates as high as 5,000 to 10,000 and conceded an accurate number is difficult to obtain because most fighters hide amongst the population in both urban and rural areas to help avoid detection by security forces.

    The Taliban is comprised of two main tiers: the top tier which includes leadership, key military and political guerillas and commanders; and the second tier, or bottom tier, comprised primarily of men from rural villages paid to set up road side bombs, launch rockets and mortars at NATO troops, and paid to pick up a gun and fight for “a few days.”

   Of the bottom tier, most are not ideologically committed to Jihad, as are top tier members; rather, the bottom tier is comprised mostly of men motivated by unemployment, the lack of change since 2001, or, RAND reported, “anger over the killing or wounding of a local villager by Afghan, U.S., or NATO forces.  Some fought because of grievances with the Afghan government or because of abuse (either actual or perceived) by Afghan or coalition forces—such as bombings and intrusive house searches.”

Foreign Fighters Allied with the Taliban

    Foreign fighters allied with the Taliban are described by RAND as an “amalgam” or fusion of “loosely knit Muslim extremists, including Al-Qaeda forces” whose ranks were comprised from primarily two types: individuals from the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks) and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians, and Libyans).

    An undisclosed number of fighters are affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and an undetermined number are motivated by the broader Jihadist goal of pushing the United States and her Western allies out of Afghanistan.

    Contrary to conventional wisdom, RAND reports that drug traffickers and criminal elements played a role in Afghan instability, in collusion with the Taliban. RAND reports in chapter four, “Drug and other criminal groups developed an intricate network to transport drugs between Afghanistan and neighboring states.  The Taliban profited from the drug trade in several ways.  They received payments to provide protection to some drug- trafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The Taliban also levied taxes on some farmers and secured bribes from drug-trafficking groups at checkpoints.”

Insurgent Activity

    Since 2002, there has been a gradual deterioration of the security environment, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2006, RAND reports a 400-percent increase in insurgent-led attacks against Afghan civilians, international aid workers, and coalition forces, with an 800-percent increase in the number of deaths as a result.

    In 2005 and 2006, the U.S. military reported the increase in violence was “particularly acute” with a doubling of remote-detonated bombings, and a tripling of armed attacks. The resulting lack of security for Afghanis assisted insurgents to establish a hold over local populations resulting in a fear to oppose the insurgents.

    “Once insurgents establish a hold over the population, those who are hostile to the insurgents often become too fearful to oppose them.  Some may be eliminated, providing an example to others.  Some may escape abroad.  Still others may be cowed into hiding their true feelings.  By threatening the population, the insurgents give individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain from cooperating with the indigenous government and external actors,” reported RAND.

    Insurgent groups were described by RAND as “learning organizations” successful in adapting their tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter coalition counterinsurgency operations. Tactics used by insurgents today mirror some employed against the Soviets, such as yielding the population centers to coalition combat forces, operate mainly from rural areas, and the distribution of propaganda to the local population and indigenous opposition forces.

    RAND reported, “As Taliban military officials argued, this is classic guerrilla warfare: ‘Our military tactic is to control a district center, kill the government soldiers there, and withdraw to our mountainous strongholds, where it would be very difficult for the government to pursue us.’”

    Taliban forces increased in size while carrying out attacks with each successive year, as RAND reported, “In 2002, they operated in squad-size units.  In 2005, they operated in company-sized units of up to 100 or more fighters.  By 2008, they occasionally operated in battalion-sized units, though they deployed in smaller units as well.  This suggests that the Taliban were able to move around with more freedom in the south without being targeted by Afghan or coalition forces as time wore on.  They also shifted from hard targets, such as U.S. forces, to soft targets, such as Afghan police and international personnel perceived to be supporting the Afghan government or coalition forces.”

U.S. & Coalition Forces

     RAND argues that U.S. and coalition action has had mixed results.  The most favorable counterinsurgency capabilities resulted when the U.S. utilized indigenous forces, and the least effective capabilities occurred whenever the U.S. acted unilaterally. The exception to poor results from the unilateral approach occurred when the U.S. utilized its Special Forces, whose results are described as “particularly effective.”

    RAND cautions U.S. policymakers, “Metaphorically, counterinsurgency is about teaching people to fish, not about doing it for them.”

   RAND examined the U.S. decision to have a light military footprint in Afghanistan to prevent large-scale resistance similar to what the Soviets encountered in the 1980s and added, “Indeed, several great powers throughout history have been defeated in Afghanistan, including the forces of Alexander the Great, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.”

    A light military footprint worked well to overthrow the Taliban in 2001, according to RAND, but had two particular drawbacks for the stability operation phase that followed. First, there were too few U.S. and Afghan forces for stabilization, and secondly, the strategy “…drew the wrong lesson from the Soviet experience.  The key lesson from the Soviet experience was not the number of Soviet forces deployed, but rather how they were used.  The Soviets fought the wrong war; they fought a conventional war against an unconventional opponent.”

    To measure the force level needed for stability operations, RAND examined 17 stability operations since World War II.  In the occupation of post-war Germany, the United States had 101.3 soldiers per 100,000 population; 12.3 per 100,000 in post-war Japan; 6.1 soldiers per 100,000 in Iraq; and only .07 (point zero seven) per 100,000 in Afghanistan.

   RAND reports, “This created a challenge in targeting Taliban…and Al-Qaeda insurgents in the early stages of the insurgency—such as 2002 and 2003—since there were virtually no trained and legitimate Afghan military and police.  Nor were there sufficient forces to secure Afghanistan’s borders.”

    An example of a successful joint U.S.-Afghan combat operation was action in Bermel Valley where American troops from the 82nd Airborne Division, in conjunction with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Militia, engaged in mine detection, mounted patrols, intelligence collection, vehicle checkpoints, combat operations, and search-and-seize missions.

    In this operation, Afghan forces led every joint mounted patrol, according to RAND, because Afghan forces “knew the ground better and could more easily spot something that was out of place or suspicious” which aided in success.

    An example of a less successful operation was “Operation Mountain Sweep” where paratroopers from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne operated unilaterally.

    RAND reports the solo U.S. “Operation Mountain Sweep” used “heavy-handed tactics” that “created significant resentment among locals in Khowst Province.  U.S. soldiers angered Afghan villagers on numerous occasions out of naiveté of Afghan social and cultural traditions, leading one Afghan government report to conclude, ‘It will be difficult forever for the coalition forces to fully befriend the people.  Instead they should try to minimize their contact with the local population and increasingly empower the Afghan forces to do the job.  The more they [U.S. troops acting alone] try to be in touch with people the more they will be prone to make cultural mistakes.’”

Direct Action Against Insurgents

    RAND found direct action against insurgents was most effective when the objective was to get local indigenous forces to use force - instead of American and NATO troops - when force was used in ways considered “legitimate,” and when the goal was to reduce the use of force.

    Four specific combat operation tactics deemed successful to varying degrees were: clear, hold, and expand; armed reconnaissance and raiding; close air support; and command and control arrangements. The permanent isolation of insurgents from the population by destroying insurgent forces and their political organizations in a specific area over the long-term has proven to be successful. The isolation, however, ideally, must be maintained by and with the local people, not imposed upon them.

    Clear, hold and expand (CHE), or, the “ink-spot strategy” is when military forces set up secure zones and slowly expand them.  The focus is on holding ground that is pro-Afghan and coalition, or at least anti-Taliban, and protecting the local government and key resources. U.S. forces are to be kept to a bare minimum with this strategy, and are to be comprised primarily of civil affairs and psychological operations personnel, along with a small contingent of combat arms personnel – a company of infantry – to provide security against an immediate threat.

    CHE forces would conduct operations in ever-expanding zones, where in the first zone, CHE forces would “target and eliminate” insurgents in the area. CHE forces, to be successful, are required to live among the local populace “for long durations to gain its trust and support and then try to separate the locals from the insurgents.”

    RAND reports, “The number-one role for these units was to target the insurgent’s organizational structure and leadership; they also had a secondary role in the conduct of raids in sanctuaries in which political sensitivities precluded larger operations.”

    Armed recon is described as the patrolling of a suspected insurgent area to gain intelligence on their activities, then initiate contact and wage battle, or confirm the area is clear of insurgents.

The mission goal is to disrupt insurgents and keep them off balance. 

Working Within A Coalition

   RAND rates the U.S. experience working with a coalition effort in Afghanistan as “mixed.” The Afghanistan coalition model was based upon a “lead nation” approach with the United States the lead donor nation tasked to restructure the Afghanistan National Army (ANA); Germany the lead for police; the United Kingdom the lead nation for counter-narcotic operations; Italy in the lead for justice; and Japan (with UN assistance) in the lead for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

    RAND reports, “In theory, each lead nation was supposed to contribute significant financial assistance, coordinate external assistance, and oversee reconstruction efforts in its sector.  In practice, this approach did not work as well as envisioned” since the U.S. provided the bulk of assistance for both the United Kingdom’s and Germany’s obligations.

    NATO’s forces in Afghanistan were rated as “generally competent” by RAND, but the NATO experience also highlighted drawbacks with multinational efforts, such as the inequality of the political will of member nations participating in the effort, for example. While Canada and Britain are described as “reliable allies who were willing to fight and die,” Germany and Norway were identified as nations with “national caveats that severely restricted their ability to fight.”

   One German soldier is quoted in the RAND report as saying, “The German government is risk averse, especially for anything more than peacekeeping operations.  So is our population.  This limits our ability—and willingness—to operate on the ground outside of our bases.”

    A lack of unity in command was a second area of concern for RAND, due to an absence of a “high representative” as was implemented in the international effort in Bosnia as part of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords to oversee reconstruction and stabilization.

    In Afghanistan, there was no unity of command for either the civilian or military efforts which led to separate U.S. and NATO military chains of command resulting in several external forces operating in the area with different missions and different rules of engagement.

    The research described in this article is from a report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

    The report “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” may be viewed in its entirety by visiting: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/

   About the author of the RAND study, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”

   Seth G. Jones is a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He is the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W. W. Norton, forthcoming) and The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

    He has published articles on a range of national security subjects in International Security, The National Interest, Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, Chicago Journal of International Law, International Affairs, and Survival, as well as such newspapers and magazines as the New York Times, Newsweek, the Financial Times, and the International Herald Tribune.

He received his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago.

Examined Insurgencies Since 1945

Greece 1945–1949

Philippines 1946–1952

Vietnam 1945–1954

Burma 1948–

Malaya 1950–1956

Colombia 1948–1962

China/Tibet 1950–1951

Kenya (Mau Mau) 1952–1956

Cuba 1958–1959

Algeria 1954–1962

Lebanon 1958–1958

Indonesia (Darul Islam) 1958–1960

Congo/Katanga 1960–1965

Guatemala 1968–1996

South Africa (African National Congress) 1983–1994

Ethiopia/Eritrea 1974–1992

Laos 1960–1973

Vietnam 1960–1975

Iraq (Kurds) 1961–1974

Yemen 1962–1969

Mozambique 1964–1974

Guinea–Bissau 1962–1974

Angola 1962–1974

Colombia 1963–

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1972–1979

Dominican Rep. 1965–1965

Nigeria/Biafra 1967–1970

Argentina (Montañeros) 1973–1977

Cambodia 1970–1975

Northern Ireland 1969–1999

Philippines (New Peoples Army) 1972–1994

Jordan (Black September) 1970–1970

Philippines (Moro National Liberation Front) 1968–

Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971–1971

Pakistan/Baluchistan 1973–1977

Angola (Unita) 1975–

Morocco (Polisario) 1975–1988

Indonesia/East Timor 1975–1999

Namibia 1960–1991

Uruguay 1963–1973

Philippines (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) 1977–

India Naxalite 1980–

Nigeria/Biafra II 1999–

Afghanistan 1996–2001

Lebanon 1975–1990

India Northeast 1952–

Indonesia/Aceh 1999–

Mozambique (Renamo) 1976–1995

Sri Lanka (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 1983–

Nicaragua 1978–1979

Afghanistan 1978–1992

Cambodia 1978–1992

El Salvador 1979–1992

Somalia (anti-Barre) 1981–1991

Senegal 1989–

Peru 1981–1992

Nicaragua (Contras) 1981–1988

Turkey (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) 1984–1999

Sudan (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 1983–

Uganda 1993–

Papua New Guinea/Bougainville 1988–1998

Liberia 1989–1996

India/Kashmir 1989–

China/Xinjiang 1991–

Rwanda 1990–

Moldova 1992–1994

Sierra Leone 1991–

Somalia 1991–

Algeria (Groupe Islamique Armé) 1992–

Croatia/Krajina 1992–1995

Afghanistan 1992–1901

Tajikistan 1992–1997

Georgia/Abkhazia 1992–1994

Azerbaijan/Ngo-Kar 1992–1994

Bosnia 1992–1995

Burundi 1993–

Pakistan (Sindhis versus Mahajirs) 1993–1999

Chechnya 1994–1996

Congo (Kabila) 1996–1997

Nepal 1997–

Congo 1998–

Chechnya II 1999–

Serbia/Kosovo 1998–1999

Nigeria/communal 1999–

Israel 1996–

Afghanistan 2001–

Ivory Coast 2002–

Sudan/Darfur 2002–

Iraq 2003–

   In June 2002, Congress directed DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to perform an independent study on the feasibility of creating a Domestic Intelligence Agency (DIA), and DHS contracted with the research firm RAND who delivered a three-volume answer.