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Historically, The Foreign Occupying Army
is Not the Solution to Defeating Insurgents
in Afghanistan & Elsewhere, RAND Study
Cautions U.S. Policymakers

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Success Most Probable With Indigenous
Effort, Denial of Sanctuary for Insurgents

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Significant Direct Intervention by
U.S. Military May Undermine Popular
Support and Legitimacy

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Ninety Insurgencies Since 1945 Examined
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EDITOR’S NOTE: This report was originally published in the October 2008 AV Political Observer. In consideration of the president’s recent decision to increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, we believe we have a responsibility to provide the public with quality information so they may be better suited to understand, and where necessary, criticize or support, our government’s policy in their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. It is the unwavering editorial position of The AV Political Observer to support the troops always, and our government when it deserves it.

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   The RAND Corporation released a report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense that explored the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations.

 

   The report, titled “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” concluded success on the ground in Afghanistan is directly related to three variables: the governing capability of the state; the ability of local police to provide security; and a lack of external support and sanctuary for insurgents.

 

   The report states, in its summary, “In many cases, a significant direct intervention by U.S. military forces may undermine popular support and legitimacy.  The United States is also unlikely to remain for the duration of most insurgencies: This study’s assessment of 90 insurgencies indicates that it takes an average of 14-years to defeat insurgents once an insurgency develops.”

 

   The RAND study defined an insurgency as “a political-military campaign by non-State actors seeking to overthrow a government or secede from a country through the use of unconventional - and sometimes conventional - military strategies and tactics.”

 

   The author, Seth G. Jones, disclosed his report examined the beginning of the insurgency in Afghanistan – identified as from 2002 until 2008 – and asked three main questions.  First, what was the nature of the insurgency?  Second, what factors have contributed to the rise of insurgencies more broadly and to the insurgency in Afghanistan in particular?  And third, what capabilities should the U.S. military consider developing to improve its ability to wage effective counterinsurgency operations?

 

The Fallacy of External Actors

 

   The 117 page, seven chapter report examined 90 insurgencies since World War II and found many policy makers in that time-frame underestimated the value of indigenous players in quelling insurrectionist forces. Indigenous government and security forces are described as “the most critical actor in a counterinsurgency campaign” because most counterinsurgency campaigns are not won or lost by a foreign occupying army.

 

   Analysis by RAND of all insurgencies since 1945 revealed successful counterinsurgency campaigns lasted an average of 14-years while unsuccessful ones lasted an average of eleven years, with an undisclosed number having ended in a draw.

 

   Also according to the RAND study, approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and eleven percent by insurgents lasted more than 20-years. American policymakers were warned that until the insurgency was defeated – through successful indigenous efforts – a long-term commitment to Afghanistan will be necessary to prop up the friendly government until victory is achieved. 

 

   The report warned, “Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so.  If they do not develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends.”

 

   In an argument against a heavy United States military footprint, the report stated, “…a lead U.S. role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success” and added, “a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they—and not foreign forces—control their destiny.  Competent governments that can provide services to their population in a timely manner can best prevent and overcome insurgencies.”

 

Indigenous Lead

 

   Three distinct groups or “actors” comprise an insurgency: insurgents, the government, and outside actors, which may support either insurgents or the government. Although outside actors may play a “pivotal role in tipping the war” in favor of either the insurgents or the government, the report cautioned “outside actors alone can rarely win the war for either side.”

 

   Indigenous popular support is the goal for all sides in an insurgency because with popular support comes assistance from the local population - money, logistics, recruits, intelligence, and other aid.

 

   “To many insurgents, the population offers a level playing field.  If insurgents manage to alienate the population from the government and acquire its active support, they are more likely to win the war.  In the end, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population - or, at worst, on its submissiveness,” the RAND report stated.

 

    RAND concluded, “Most policymakers - including in the United States - repeatedly ignore or underestimate the importance of locals to counterinsurgency warfare.  Counterinsurgency requires not only the capability to conduct unconventional war, but also the capability to shape the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces.”


Past Insurgencies Examined

 

    Insurgencies Since 1945 Examined by RAND met three criteria to be included in their study: they involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and non-state groups who sought to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence to change government policies; (2) at least 1,000 individuals were killed over the course of the conflict, with a yearly average of at least 100; and (3) at least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).

 

   Three variables linked with the success or failure of past counterinsurgency efforts were: the capability of local police and security forces; quality of local governance; and external support and sanctuary for insurgents. The ability for local security and police to establish law and order was identified as “paramount” to success.

 

Law and Order

 

   Governments with competent security forces won in two-thirds of all completed insurgencies while governments defeated insurgencies less than one-third of the time when their competence was medium or low.

 

    Characteristics of a competent security force include initiative, good intelligence, motivated soldiers with quality leadership, and the ability to learn and adapt during combat operations.

Low competent organizations were characterized by corruption, along with poorly financed and equipped personnel, and members that are politically divided.

 

    Governments often relied upon paramilitary forces over local police to engage the insurgency because of the above mentioned superior operational characteristics of security forces compared to local police; however, local police are described by RAND as, “perhaps the most critical component of indigenous forces.”

 

    On policing, RAND stated, “They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters.  Unlike the military, the police usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these areas; and better intelligence.  This makes them a direct target of insurgent forces, who often try to kill or infiltrate them.”

 

    An effective police force is critical to fighting an insurgency because there are limits to the use of military force, according to RAND. Because the enemy frequently holds little territory, and when insurgent operations are disturbed by government military operations, insurgents transfer their operations to another area – one absent, or with limited government military capability – leaving the problem of the insurgency “unresolved.”

 

    “A viable indigenous police force with a permanent presence in urban and rural areas is a critical component of counterinsurgency,” the report concluded on the question as to the importance of a local police force.

 

    As to how RAND determined competency, a footnote in the report stated that RAND “assessed the capability of government security forces by making a qualitative judgment about how competent their forces were in conducting counterinsurgency warfare.  We tried to avoid the endogeneity problem of coding forces as competent if the government won—and incompetent if they lost.  Rather, we relied on the judgments of area specialists and historians that covered each insurgency.”

 

Civil Government

 

    RAND reported the greater the competence level of government in providing its people basic services - the provision of essential services to the population by a legitimate central authority in a timely manner - the greater their ability to undermine support for and defeat insurgents. 

 

    “The absence of good governance is often a root cause of an insurgency.  A basic need of any insurgent group is an attractive cause,” stated the report.

 

    The RAND report singled out corruption as a particularly “invidious,” or difficult challenge because it directly undermined the government, hampered economic growth, disproportionately burdened the poor, undermined the rule of law, damaged government legitimacy in the minds of the people, and funneled “scarce public resources” away from projects that benefited society as a whole.

 

    “However, the most damaging effect of corruption is its impact on the social fabric of society: corruption undermines the population’s trust in the political system, political institutions, and political leadership,” stated the report.

 

    Cultural realities in Afghanistan present a peculiar challenge for Western governments.  RAND stated, “Afghan territory has historically been controlled by tribes and warlords, and its inhabitants have generally pledged loyalty to those with similar kinship ties and patrilineal descent rather than to the state authority.  Governance problems such as this can often be difficult to fix, especially in the near term.”

 

External Support

 

    RAND research disclosed insurgencies that received support from external sources won more than 50 percent of the time, while those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. External support may come in two forms: direct assistance – money, arms, training, logistics, diplomatic backing – and secondly, from the freedom to use foreign territory as sanctuary.

 

   As is the case currently where Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, the RAND report warned, “…external sanctuary is a significant help to insurgents, often making the difference between their success or failure.  Insurgents have been successful approximately 43 percent of the time when they enjoyed a sanctuary.”

 

   The report concluded its chapter on research of past insurgencies when it described indigenous forces as the “default force of choice” because “even if tactically successful, a unilateral operation by external forces may ultimately lead to failure by undermining and de-legitimizing the very indigenous capability the external actor is trying to build.”

 

Afghan Recent History: A Legacy of War

 

    Chapter three of the RAND report focused on the history of insurgency in Afghanistan.  Afghanistan was ruled by monarchy for over two centuries until 1973 when Mohammed Daoud deposed his brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, and declared Afghanistan a Republic. In 1978, army officers carried out a bloody coup which led to the death of Daoud who was replaced by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was also eventually murdered.

 

   RAND reported, “Moscow grew increasingly concerned about the deteriorating security situation and feared that Taraki’s successor, Hafizullah Amin, would turn to the West for assistance. Thus began Afghanistan’s age of insurgency.”

 

The Red Army Fails

 

   Beginning with the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion, Afghanistan has experienced four major insurgencies: the Mujahideen wars against the Soviet Union (1979–1989); the rise of the Taliban (1994–2001); the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Taliban regime (2001–2002); and the return of the Taliban (2002–present).

 

   During the fifteen-year Soviet occupation, the Red Army was able to control major cities and provincial towns, however, they were never able to secure and control the countryside. Throughout the occupation by Soviet troops, the situation in the countryside worsened for the Red Army and the Soviet installed Afghan puppet government as the Mujahideen steadily gained popular support.

 

    Of critical value to the Mujahideen was support from Pakistan in the form of money, weapons and training, and the funneling of aid from United States and Saudi Arabia, among other countries. Pakistan also provided sanctuary to the rebels which kept them safe from attack by Soviet forces.

 

    “Soviet losses mounted steadily, despite the Soviets’ repeated efforts to defeat the Mujahideen through the widespread deployment of mines, carpet-bombing of rebel areas, and the use of scorched-earth tactics,” RAND reported.

 

    The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left in its wake an estimated one million dead Afghanis, 15,000 Soviet soldiers killed, with 500,000 sick or wounded.

 

The Rise of the Taliban

 

    Pro-Moscow forces clung to power for three-years after the Red Army withdrawal, until 1992, when Kabul fell to Mujahideen forces who established a new government, which lasted until 1994. In late 1994, a new movement named the Taliban – from the plural of Talib, an Arabic word denoting an Islamic student – seized control of Kandahar, in the south.

 

   Headed by Mullah Omar, the Taliban capitalized on the war weariness of the people and were well received as they promised to be a cleansing force that would rid Afghanistan of factionalism, corruption and violence.

 

    By February 1995, the Taliban captured nine out of thirty provinces, mainly in the south and east of the country.  In 1996, the Taliban captured the capital city of Kabul, and by 1998, captured and controlled the northern cities of Mazar, Kunduz, and Taloqan. 

 

    By 2001 the Taliban controlled virtually all of Afghanistan with the only exception being a small sliver of land northeast of Kabul where the Northern Alliance still ruled. With Taliban rule came Shari’a Law, which banned music, women from working or getting an education, and prohibited Freedom of The Press. Also under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became a training ground for Al-Qaeda.

 

   After the attacks of 9/11, United States and friendly Afghan forces conducted a series of military operations – Operation Enduring Freedom - that put the Taliban on the defensive and ultimately forced them into Pakistan seeking refuge. Beginning in the spring of 2002, Taliban and their allied forces began to conduct offensive operations from bases inside Pakistan - that continue to this day - in an attempt to overthrow the Afghan government and coerce the American forces into leaving.

 

    Of special note is RAND’s conclusion that Pakistan played a critical role in all recent Afghan insurgencies and will be key in defeating the current insurgency.

 

    RAND reports, “Pakistan played two particularly important roles.  First, the Pakistan government, especially the ISI, supported the victors of each insurgency: the Mujahideen, Taliban, and U.S. forces during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Since Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,160-mile border, Pakistani leaders have historically viewed the ability to influence Afghanistan as critical for strategic depth.  Second, Afghan insurgent groups have repeatedly used Pakistan as a sanctuary.  These findings have significant implications for understanding the Taliban’s resurgence and assessing how they can be defeated.”

 

The Taliban Today

 

    The Taliban have been historically motivated to impose a radical form Sunni Islam in Afghanistan, according to RAND, with their primary strategy to overthrow the Afghan government, and to break the political will of the United States and her coalition partners, thereby forcing all foreign armies to withdraw.

 

    RAND reports an influx of new fighters recruited at Madrassas and at other locations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  RAND estimated full-time Taliban fighters at several thousand, but acknowledged other estimates as high as 5,000 to 10,000 and conceded an accurate number is difficult to obtain because most fighters hide amongst the population in both urban and rural areas to help avoid detection by security forces.

 

    The Taliban is comprised of two main tiers: the top tier which includes leadership, key military and political guerillas and commanders; and the second tier, or bottom tier, comprised primarily of men from rural villages paid to set up road side bombs, launch rockets and mortars at NATO troops, and paid to pick up a gun and fight for “a few days.”

 

   Of the bottom tier, most are not ideologically committed to Jihad, as are top tier members; rather, the bottom tier is comprised mostly of men motivated by unemployment, the lack of change since 2001, or, RAND reported, “anger over the killing or wounding of a local villager by Afghan, U.S., or NATO forces.  Some fought because of grievances with the Afghan government or because of abuse (either actual or perceived) by Afghan or coalition forces—such as bombings and intrusive house searches.”

 

Foreign Fighters Allied with the Taliban

 

    Foreign fighters allied with the Taliban are described by RAND as an “amalgam” or fusion of “loosely knit Muslim extremists, including Al-Qaeda forces” whose ranks were comprised from primarily two types: individuals from the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks) and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians, and Libyans).

 

    An undisclosed number of fighters are affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and an undetermined number are motivated by the broader Jihadist goal of pushing the United States and her Western allies out of Afghanistan.

 

    Contrary to conventional wisdom, RAND reports that drug traffickers and criminal elements played a role in Afghan instability, in collusion with the Taliban. RAND reports in chapter four, “Drug and other criminal groups developed an intricate network to transport drugs between Afghanistan and neighboring states.  The Taliban profited from the drug trade in several ways.  They received payments to provide protection to some drug- trafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The Taliban also levied taxes on some farmers and secured bribes from drug-trafficking groups at checkpoints.”

 

Insurgent Activity

 

    Since 2002, there has been a gradual deterioration of the security environment, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2006, RAND reports a 400-percent increase in insurgent-led attacks against Afghan civilians, international aid workers, and coalition forces, with an 800-percent increase in the number of deaths as a result.

 

    In 2005 and 2006, the U.S. military reported the increase in violence was “particularly acute” with a doubling of remote-detonated bombings, and a tripling of armed attacks. The resulting lack of security for Afghanis assisted insurgents to establish a hold over local populations resulting in a fear to oppose the insurgents.

 

    “Once insurgents establish a hold over the population, those who are hostile to the insurgents often become too fearful to oppose them.  Some may be eliminated, providing an example to others.  Some may escape abroad.  Still others may be cowed into hiding their true feelings.  By threatening the population, the insurgents give individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain from cooperating with the indigenous government and external actors,” reported RAND.

 

    Insurgent groups were described by RAND as “learning organizations” successful in adapting their tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter coalition counterinsurgency operations. Tactics used by insurgents today mirror some employed against the Soviets, such as yielding the population centers to coalition combat forces, operate mainly from rural areas, and the distribution of propaganda to the local population and indigenous opposition forces.

 

    RAND reported, “As Taliban military officials argued, this is classic guerrilla warfare: ‘Our military tactic is to control a district center, kill the government soldiers there, and withdraw to our mountainous strongholds, where it would be very difficult for the government to pursue us.’”

 

    Taliban forces increased in size while carrying out attacks with each successive year, as RAND reported, “In 2002, they operated in squad-size units.  In 2005, they operated in company-sized units of up to 100 or more fighters.  By 2008, they occasionally operated in battalion-sized units, though they deployed in smaller units as well.  This suggests that the Taliban were able to move around with more freedom in the south without being targeted by Afghan or coalition forces as time wore on.  They also shifted from hard targets, such as U.S. forces, to soft targets, such as Afghan police and international personnel perceived to be supporting the Afghan government or coalition forces.”

 

U.S. & Coalition Forces

 

     RAND argues that U.S. and coalition action has had mixed results.  The most favorable counterinsurgency capabilities resulted when the U.S. utilized indigenous forces, and the least effective capabilities occurred whenever the U.S. acted unilaterally. The exception to poor results from the unilateral approach occurred when the U.S. utilized its Special Forces, whose results are described as “particularly effective.”

 

    RAND cautions U.S. policymakers, “Metaphorically, counterinsurgency is about teaching people to fish, not about doing it for them.”

 

   RAND examined the U.S. decision to have a light military footprint in Afghanistan to prevent large-scale resistance similar to what the Soviets encountered in the 1980s and added, “Indeed, several great powers throughout history have been defeated in Afghanistan, including the forces of Alexander the Great, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.”

 

    A light military footprint worked well to overthrow the Taliban in 2001, according to RAND, but had two particular drawbacks for the stability operation phase that followed. First, there were too few U.S. and Afghan forces for stabilization, and secondly, the strategy “…drew the wrong lesson from the Soviet experience.  The key lesson from the Soviet experience was not the number of Soviet forces deployed, but rather how they were used.  The Soviets fought the wrong war; they fought a conventional war against an unconventional opponent.”

 

    To measure the force level needed for stability operations, RAND examined 17 stability operations since World War II.  In the occupation of post-war Germany, the United States had 101.3 soldiers per 100,000 population; 12.3 per 100,000 in post-war Japan; 6.1 soldiers per 100,000 in Iraq; and only .07 (point zero seven) per 100,000 in Afghanistan.

 

   RAND reports, “This created a challenge in targeting Taliban…and Al-Qaeda insurgents in the early stages of the insurgency—such as 2002 and 2003—since there were virtually no trained and legitimate Afghan military and police.  Nor were there sufficient forces to secure Afghanistan’s borders.”

 

    An example of a successful joint U.S.-Afghan combat operation was action in Bermel Valley where American troops from the 82nd Airborne Division, in conjunction with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Militia, engaged in mine detection, mounted patrols, intelligence collection, vehicle checkpoints, combat operations, and search-and-seize missions.

 

    In this operation, Afghan forces led every joint mounted patrol, according to RAND, because Afghan forces “knew the ground better and could more easily spot something that was out of place or suspicious” which aided in success.

 

    An example of a less successful operation was “Operation Mountain Sweep” where paratroopers from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne operated unilaterally.

 

    RAND reports the solo U.S. “Operation Mountain Sweep” used “heavy-handed tactics” that “created significant resentment among locals in Khowst Province.  U.S. soldiers angered Afghan villagers on numerous occasions out of naiveté of Afghan social and cultural traditions, leading one Afghan government report to conclude, ‘It will be difficult forever for the coalition forces to fully befriend the people.  Instead they should try to minimize their contact with the local population and increasingly empower the Afghan forces to do the job.  The more they [U.S. troops acting alone] try to be in touch with people the more they will be prone to make cultural mistakes.’”

 

Direct Action Against Insurgents

 

    RAND found direct action against insurgents was most effective when the objective was to get local indigenous forces to use force - instead of American and NATO troops - when force was used in ways considered “legitimate,” and when the goal was to reduce the use of force.

 

    Four specific combat operation tactics deemed successful to varying degrees were: clear, hold, and expand; armed reconnaissance and raiding; close air support; and command and control arrangements. The permanent isolation of insurgents from the population by destroying insurgent forces and their political organizations in a specific area over the long-term has proven to be successful. The isolation, however, ideally, must be maintained by and with the local people, not imposed upon them.

 

    Clear, hold and expand (CHE), or, the “ink-spot strategy” is when military forces set up secure zones and slowly expand them.  The focus is on holding ground that is pro-Afghan and coalition, or at least anti-Taliban, and protecting the local government and key resources. U.S. forces are to be kept to a bare minimum with this strategy, and are to be comprised primarily of civil affairs and psychological operations personnel, along with a small contingent of combat arms personnel – a company of infantry – to provide security against an immediate threat.

 

    CHE forces would conduct operations in ever-expanding zones, where in the first zone, CHE forces would “target and eliminate” insurgents in the area. CHE forces, to be successful, are required to live among the local populace “for long durations to gain its trust and support and then try to separate the locals from the insurgents.”

 

    RAND reports, “The number-one role for these units was to target the insurgent’s organizational structure and leadership; they also had a secondary role in the conduct of raids in sanctuaries in which political sensitivities precluded larger operations.”

 

    Armed recon is described as the patrolling of a suspected insurgent area to gain intelligence on their activities, then initiate contact and wage battle, or confirm the area is clear of insurgents.

The mission goal is to disrupt insurgents and keep them off balance. 

 

Working Within A Coalition

 

   RAND rates the U.S. experience working with a coalition effort in Afghanistan as “mixed.” The Afghanistan coalition model was based upon a “lead nation” approach with the United States the lead donor nation tasked to restructure the Afghanistan National Army (ANA); Germany the lead for police; the United Kingdom the lead nation for counter-narcotic operations; Italy in the lead for justice; and Japan (with UN assistance) in the lead for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

 

    RAND reports, “In theory, each lead nation was supposed to contribute significant financial assistance, coordinate external assistance, and oversee reconstruction efforts in its sector.  In practice, this approach did not work as well as envisioned” since the U.S. provided the bulk of assistance for both the United Kingdom’s and Germany’s obligations.

 

    NATO’s forces in Afghanistan were rated as “generally competent” by RAND, but the NATO experience also highlighted drawbacks with multinational efforts, such as the inequality of the political will of member nations participating in the effort, for example. While Canada and Britain are described as “reliable allies who were willing to fight and die,” Germany and Norway were identified as nations with “national caveats that severely restricted their ability to fight.”

 

   One German soldier is quoted in the RAND report as saying, “The German government is risk averse, especially for anything more than peacekeeping operations.  So is our population.  This limits our ability—and willingness—to operate on the ground outside of our bases.”

 

    A lack of unity in command was a second area of concern for RAND, due to an absence of a “high representative” as was implemented in the international effort in Bosnia as part of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords to oversee reconstruction and stabilization.

 

    In Afghanistan, there was no unity of command for either the civilian or military efforts which led to separate U.S. and NATO military chains of command resulting in several external forces operating in the area with different missions and different rules of engagement.

 

    The research described in this article is from a report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

 

    The report “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” may be viewed in its entirety by visiting: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/

 

   About the author of the RAND study, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan


   Seth G. Jones is a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He is the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W. W. Norton, forthcoming)
and The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

    He has published articles on a range of national security subjects in International Security, The National Interest, Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, Chicago Journal of International Law, International Affairs, and Survival, as well as such newspapers and magazines as the New York Times, Newsweek, the Financial Times, and the International Herald Tribune.

He received his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago.

 

Examined Insurgencies Since 1945

China 1946–1950

Greece 1945–1949

Philippines 1946–1952

Vietnam 1945–1954

Burma 1948–

Malaya 1950–1956

Colombia 1948–1962

China/Tibet 1950–1951

Kenya (Mau Mau) 1952–1956

Cuba 1958–1959

Algeria 1954–1962

Lebanon 1958–1958

Indonesia (Darul Islam) 1958–1960

Congo/Katanga 1960–1965

Guatemala 1968–1996

South Africa (African National Congress) 1983–1994

Ethiopia/Eritrea 1974–1992

Laos 1960–1973

Vietnam 1960–1975

Iraq (Kurds) 1961–1974

Yemen 1962–1969

Mozambique 1964–1974

Guinea–Bissau 1962–1974

Angola 1962–1974

Colombia 1963–

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1972–1979

Dominican Rep. 1965–1965

Nigeria/Biafra 1967–1970

Argentina (Montañeros) 1973–1977

Cambodia 1970–1975

Northern Ireland 1969–1999

Philippines (New Peoples Army) 1972–1994

Jordan (Black September) 1970–1970

Philippines (Moro National Liberation Front) 1968–

Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971–1971

Pakistan/Baluchistan 1973–1977

Angola (Unita) 1975–

Morocco (Polisario) 1975–1988

Indonesia/East Timor 1975–1999

Namibia 1960–1991

Uruguay 1963–1973

Philippines (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) 1977–

India Naxalite 1980–

Nigeria/Biafra II 1999–

Afghanistan 1996–2001

Lebanon 1975–1990

India Northeast 1952–

Indonesia/Aceh 1999–

Mozambique (Renamo) 1976–1995

Sri Lanka (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 1983–

Nicaragua 1978–1979

Afghanistan 1978–1992

Cambodia 1978–1992

El Salvador 1979–1992

Somalia (anti-Barre) 1981–1991

Senegal 1989–

Peru 1981–1992

Nicaragua (Contras) 1981–1988

Turkey (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) 1984–1999

Sudan (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 1983–

Uganda 1993–

Papua New Guinea/Bougainville 1988–1998

Liberia 1989–1996

India/Kashmir 1989–

China/Xinjiang 1991–

Rwanda 1990–

Moldova 1992–1994

Sierra Leone 1991–

Somalia 1991–

Algeria (Groupe Islamique Armé) 1992–

Croatia/Krajina 1992–1995

Afghanistan 1992–1901

Tajikistan 1992–1997

Georgia/Abkhazia 1992–1994

Azerbaijan/Ngo-Kar 1992–1994

Bosnia 1992–1995

Burundi 1993–

Pakistan (Sindhis versus Mahajirs) 1993–1999

Chechnya 1994–1996

Congo (Kabila) 1996–1997

Nepal 1997–

Congo 1998–

Chechnya II 1999–

Serbia/Kosovo 1998–1999

Nigeria/communal 1999–

Israel 1996–

Afghanistan 2001–

Ivory Coast 2002–

Sudan/Darfur 2002–

Iraq 2003–

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Creation of Domestic Intelligence
Agency Brings Potential to
‘Significantly Change the Nature and Character’ of Nation, Department of Homeland Security Warned

 ---

A History of Government Spying on The People
in a Free Society Examined

 ---

In the Name of National Security
Since the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798

 ----

CIA: Foreign ~ DIA: Domestic

 
   To ask the federal government if it needed more power is akin to asking the barber if you could use a haircut; but that very question was asked by Congress of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DHS was required to provide an answer.

   In June 2002, Congress directed DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to perform an independent study on the feasibility of creating a Domestic Intelligence Agency (DIA), and DHS contracted with the research firm RAND who delivered a three-volume answer.


   RAND
was not asked to make a definitive recommendation about whether to create such an agency, but was charged with examining relevant options and issues in order to frame policy choices.  The focus of this AV Political Observer report is on Volume I: “The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society; A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence Agency.”


   In the report’s preface,
RAND declared the volume to be of interest to State and local governments, law enforcement, and Civil Rights and Civil Liberty organizations. 

 

Domestic Law Enforcement v.
Foreign Intelligence Operations


   Although viewed as separate functions within government, intelligence and law enforcement are described by RAND as the “core of government attempts to prevent violent and other criminal activity.” 


   The traditional role for U.S. intelligence activity has concerned itself with the gathering of information on threats posed by foreign agencies in their overseas activities then using the information to take action to prevent attacks - not as evidence for prosecution in court - while law enforcement, in contrast, is done “at home” and is largely “a reactive enterprise.”


   RAND
characterized law enforcement’s role as acting after something “already happened,” and were charged with making it possible to “identify, apprehend, and punish those who broke the law.”


   RAND
reported a “wall” had been built between the permitted activities of U.S. intelligence gathering activities and their actions on foreign soil when compared to domestic law enforcement, where each was permitted to operate under “very different sets of rules and barriers.”


    “Differences between what Americans were comfortable with happening outside U.S. borders and which activities targeting Americans they thought should be prohibited to safeguard Freedom from government intrusion” was cited as the explanation for Americans’ support for two separate policies and operating parameters, one for domestic law enforcement and one for CIA.  That “wall,” although unnamed by RAND, is believed by astute political observers to be the Bill of Rights.


   9/11 was cited as the singular event that “called into question the fundamental assumptions that had underpinned U.S. intelligence and law enforcement activities” for many Americans; an event without which, according to RAND, would not likely have “led to demand for more, and more effective, terrorism prevention and preparedness activities” by the federal government.


   Two camps emerged in the new order: those advocating for “significant alteration in the ground rules” regulating government monitoring and intervention activities within the United States (a political philosophy advocated by Neo-Conservatives), and those that still adhered to the nation’s “history of distrusting centralized government power and, as a result, often restrained government control over the lives and activities of individual citizens.”


   Although not identified as “Neo-Conservative” (Neo-Con) in the RAND report, the Neo-Con Bush/Cheney Administration advocated and implemented policies of federal government monitoring and intervention activities on U.S. citizens within the United States.


    The Neo-Con viewpoint is characterized by RAND as promoting an “intelligence must come home” philosophy where “the government must be able to use data on persons and organizations located in the United States” in order to prevent future terrorist attacks at home.


   RAND
cautioned policymakers that any domestic response to a threat has consequences of its own to include “the potential to significantly change the nature and character of the country.” RAND concluded although domestic intelligence activities must be sufficient to meet the threat, it was also as important domestic intelligence activities be “acceptable to the population they are designed to protect.”


   Americans’ “deeply held values of personal Freedom and Liberty” have been at the forefront of the public policy debate on the appropriateness of government domestic intelligence gathering operations, reported RAND.

Among the issues deemed relevant and central in the consideration of the creation of a DIA are the problems associated with the “difficulty of identifying a small number of threatening individuals in the general population of a large and diverse nation” and “concern about the effect of intelligence activities on personal privacy and Civil Liberties.”


   Since 9/11,
Rand reported, questions have been raised about the type of information the federal government has gathered on individuals and organizations within the U.S., the methods used to collect the information, and how the information was used.

 

DIA in American History


RAND
defined Domestic Intelligence as: “efforts by government organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that are not related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity."  Emphasis original.

 

War-Time Conditions Equal the Loss of Liberty


   U.S.
government domestic intelligence gathering dates back to the founding of the United States and has been cyclical in nature, according to the report, and the nation has had several periods where concerns over “enemies within” have spurred increased domestic spying activities.


   From President John Adams and his concerns with French spies, to President George W. Bush and Al-Qaeda, two themes have emerged repeatedly, along with “remarkably similar arguments” over how to protect the nation against potential threats.


   The first theme is the establishment of political control over counter-terrorism and domestic intelligence gathering operations, to include the appropriate scope, limitations and responsibility. 

  
Secondly is the “balance” between Civil Liberties and national security, especially in time of war.
Government domestic surveillance has been “sporadic” in the first 150 years of U.S. history with the federal overnment “responding ad hoc” to the crisis or war of the moment, RAND reported.

   Traditionally, government domestic spying ceased when the crisis or war ended, and the governmental mechanisms that supported the operation were dismantled.


   In response to concerns with French spies in America during the presidency of John Adams, Congress passed four laws in 1798 – all in the name of national security - known as the Alien and Sedition Acts, which “increased the government’s authority to crack down on dissent.”  


   The Naturalization Act, the first of the four laws, extended the residence requirement for U.S. citizenship from five years to 14 years.  The Alien Act granted the President of the United States the authority to deport any alien whom he deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” 


   The Alien Enemies Act allowed, “in wartime, all citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be in the United States and not naturalized…liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as enemy aliens.”


   RAND
reported under the Sedition Act, any person found guilty of “writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous or malicious writing or writing against the United States” was subject to a $2,000 fine and two years imprisonment.


   The RAND report continued, “The Federalists blatantly used the Sedition Act against their political opposition.  For instance, the Sedition Act was used to shut down several opposition newspapers or arrest their editors.  The public overwhelmingly viewed the Alien and Sedition Laws as an assault on First Amendment freedoms.

   "In response to the Alien and Sedition laws, Jefferson and Madison anonymously drafted the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which declared the Alien and Sedition Acts void and accused Congress of overstepping its authority.  

   "The public’s discontent with the Alien and Sedition laws was mighty and probably played a large part in the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800.  Ultimately, the Alien and Sedition Acts were repealed or allowed to expire, and they became viewed as examples of unacceptable governmental interference in the political process and served to constrain future leaders when responding to dissent. 

   "
During subsequent episodes of wartime, Congress enacted laws that restricted Civil Liberties (using the same national security arguments that underlay the Alien and Sedition Acts), but never to the extent that the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798 did.”

 

Civil War & Spanish-American War


   Domestic “security intelligence functions” were the purview of the military during the Civil War and surveillance programs were discontinued after the war ended. 

Intelligence did not become institutionalized within the military until the establishment of the Office of Naval Investigations (ONI) in 1882. The Army’s first permanent intelligence organization was established in 1885.


   ONI was created for “observing and reporting on advances in maritime technology overseas” with the United States’ victory over the Spanish Navy during the Spanish-American War confirming the value of ONI.  In 1899, the office became formally institutionalized in the Navy bureaucracy.”

 

WWI


   With the United States’ entry into World War I, the federal government passed a flurry of legislation – all in the name of national security - reminiscent of the Alien and Sedition Acts.  The Immigration (1917), Espionage (1917), Sedition (1918), and Anarchist (1918) Acts provided the Justice Department with legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities.


   The Espionage Act of 1917 made opposition to the draft “and other wartime policies” illegal, and the Sedition Act of 1918 made it illegal to criticize the government, especially in its prosecution of the war.  The Immigration Act of 1917 enlarged the classes of aliens excludable from the United States, and the Anarchist Act of 1918 expanded the provisions for excluding subversive aliens.


   Unlike earlier periods in U.S. history, the conclusion of World War I did not bring about an end to domestic intelligence activities initiated in response to the War.  In addition to the Justice Department’s and the Bureau of Investigation’s (BoI) continued domestic surveillance, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) also spied on Americans after World War I.


   RAND
reported, after World War I, the MID “resumed investigations aimed at strikes, labor unrest, radicals, and the foreign language press.”  

 

FDR & The List


   In his 1934 State of the Union address, FDR identified crime as a serious threat to national security, a threat that required, in the words of FDR, “the strong arm of the federal government” to combat.  In response, in 1935, the BoI became the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a national law enforcement agency, and in 1939, domestic intelligence activity became institutionalized within the FBI.


   It was in 1939 FBI began to develop a list of individuals – titled the Custodial Detention Index - “on whom information [was] available indicating strongly that [their] presence at liberty in this country in time of war or national emergency would constitute a menace to the public peace and safety of the United States Government”


   The program first targeted the Socialist Workers Political Party, communist organizations, to include their front-groups, “as well as persons reported as pronouncedly pro-Japanese”


   In 1943, the Attorney General decided that the Custodial Detention Index was no longer useful, was based on “faulty assumptions” and ordered it abolished.


   “The FBI director did not comply with the Attorney General’s order to abolish the list,” RAND reported, “and instead, the FBI changed the name from the Custodial Detention Index to the Security Index.  Neither the Attorney General nor the Justice Department was informed of the decision to maintain the list.”

 

1947 National Security Act


   Foreign intelligence was conducted by the military and the State Department until 1947, when CIA was created as part of the 1947 National Security Act (NSA).  The NSA explicitly prohibited CIA from performing “law enforcement or internal security functions.”


   “Ironically, while the establishment of the CIA was, in part, an effort to centralize authority, its result was to divide intelligence into two spheres: domestic and foreign,” RAND reported on the 1947 NSA.

 

FBI Domestic Spying


   Congress gave FBI increased powers in the 1950s.  The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 outlined specific standards for the apprehension of individuals in the event of an “internal security emergency.”  The basic criterion to have one’s name added to the list was whether there was “reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage and sabotage” 


   The criteria used to be included on the new Security Index List compiled by FBI was not adjusted in accordance with the new law.  RAND reported, “In fact, the Attorney General advised [FBI Director] Hoover to disregard the law and proceed with the program as previously outlined.’”


   By May 1951, the number of names on the Security Index List had grown to 15,390.  By the end of 1954, the number grew to 26,174 with 11,033 identified for “priority apprehension.”


   In 1955, FBI voluntarily revised criteria used to place a name on the list and created a Subversives Control Section (SCS) within the department to do so.  The purpose of the SCS was to “minimize the inevitable criticism of the dual role” it had in both investigating and making judgments on “the soundness of these cases” As a result the number of names on the Security Index List was reduced to 12,870 by mid-1958.


   However, the names taken off the list were retained by FBI field offices, and those individuals still listed were given an opportunity to have their names removed on the condition they become an FBI informant or intelligence source.


   RAND
reported, “Consequently, the canceled cards served as a supplementary detention list, despite the tighter standards for the Security Index (Church Committee Report, 1976, p. 446). In 1956, the canceled cards were the bases for a Communist Index.”


   In 1971, Congress repealed the 1950 Emergency Detention Act, which also repealed the Security Index List.  In response, FBI reconstituted the Security Index List into the Administrative Index, based upon advice of the Attorney General that the repeal did not “alter or limit the FBI’s authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured pursuant to its statutory and Presidential authority.”


   In 1970, President Nixon appointed a “secret interagency taskforce” that recommended the president authorize a series of “clearly illegal” investigative techniques, to include the “increased use of wiretaps and bugs, authorizing the interception of telegraph and other communications transmitted internationally, and lowering the minimum age of informers to eighteen”


   A string of hearings began in the U.S. Senate’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that examined federal data banks and the Bill of Rights.  Described as a “pivotal point” in domestic intelligence gathering operations, the subcommittee reflected “the growing concern among Americans for the protection of the privacy of the individual against the information power of government”

 

CIA Domestic Spying


   Despite the prohibition in U.S. law for doing so, CIA conducted domestic intelligence operations beginning in the 1950s.  Dubbed “Operation CHAOS,” the operation - one of the largest domestic surveillance programs in the history of the United States - became “the centerpiece of a major CIA effort begun in 1967 in response to [the LBJ] White House pressure for intelligence about foreign influence on American dissent.”


   The mission of Operation CHAOS in 1967 was to “gather and evaluate all available information about foreign links to racial, antiwar, and other protest activity” in the U.S.  The CHAOS project “amassed thousands of files on Americans, indexed hundreds of thousands of Americans into its computer records, and disseminated thousands of reports about Americans to the FBI and other government offices. Some of the information concerned the domestic activity of those Americans.”


   In 1967, it was revealed in Ramparts magazine that CIA was secretly funding the National Student Association, the largest student group in the United States. 

 

The Church Committee


   On the heels of Watergate, in 1974, The New York Times accused CIA of domestic spying.  The revelation brought about a “firestorm of public outrage” that, in-turn, piqued the interest of Congress to investigate the allegations.  The New York Times article focused upon Operation CHAOS, the operation that illegally monitored the activities of thousands of antiwar and Civil Rights activists.


    The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (known as the Church Committee after its chair, Frank Church) issued 14 reports that revealed “widespread abuses of power” not just in CIA, but also FBI and military intelligence.


   The Church Committee documented, “FBI’s extensive use of illegal investigative techniques and the questionable authority under which many FBI programs operated. They discovered that the presidents and their Attorneys General in some cases had no knowledge of the scope and purpose of highly questionable FBI activities and in others sought to avoid meeting their oversight responsibilities. They also discovered that FBI investigations were not confined to criminals or suspected spies but also targeted individuals and organizations engaged in legitimate political activities.” 


   Facts uncovered by Church Committee findings severely weakened the trust of Americans in FBI.  RAND reported, “In fact, public-opinion polls taken in 1975 found that only 37 percent of respondents held a ‘highly favorable’ rating of the FBI, a drop from an 85-percent rating in 1966 and a 71-percent rating in 1970.”


   In February 1976, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the FBI that charged “86 percent of 300 ‘soft cases’ that it had reviewed (cases based on ‘soft’ evidence, such as the way a person looked), no connection at all was made with extremist groups, yet the data collected were not only retained but passed on to third parties. By middle of the 1970s, the FBI ‘was a demoralized agency that had lost the confidence of the American people.’”


   In 1978, President Carter signed an Executive Order that prevented FBI from “engaging in the prevention of subversion.”  Also in 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  FISA established a special court to review government requests for electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens and resident aliens.  

 

9/11


   With 9/11, the mantra of the Bush Administration became one of, “to defend LibertyAmerica needed to curtail it.”  In a blow to Liberty, in October 2001, Congress passed – without first actually reading the Bill – and President Bush signed, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act.


   RAND
reported, “The PATRIOT Act reversed some of the reforms of the 1970s, including the removal or reduction of some of the safeguards in the 1978 FISA law. In addition to traditional wiretapping, Internet activity, email, and voice mail could now be monitored with reduced court oversight.  In July 2008, President Bush signed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 into law.


   The act makes further amendments to FISA by granting immunity to telecommunication companies that cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies by providing personal records of suspected individuals, and it allows the government to conduct warrantless surveillance for up to a week instead of the previously allowed 48 hours.”

 

DIA Organizational Models


   Two options were examined for the creation of a DIA: a separate, independent, stand-alone agency versus a subordinated DIA under an existing agency.


   RAND
explored how a new subordinate agency may be organized, and addressed various factors such as structure, institutional characteristic, and fit within a specific U.S. intelligence and law enforcement context.


   The five primary requirements for a DIA are: information collection capabilities; analysis capacity; storage to retain relevant information; information-sharing and transfer mechanisms to forward and share data with other organizations; and the capability, willingness and legal authority to act on relevant information.


   CIA
, FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were identified as potential parent-agencies under which a DIA may be subordinated.


   FBI was described as the “primary locus” - or center of activity or power - for a DIA when FBI’s current responsibility for criminal law enforcement, domestic counter-terrorism, and domestic counter-intelligence activities were factored into the equation. FBI falls under the purview of the Department of Justice.


    A second organizational suggestion was to place DIA under CIA purview with the supporting argument being that to combine foreign and domestic intelligence operations would “mesh operational cultures effectively.”


   CIA
control would not carry with it FBI’s “professional cultural dissonance between its law enforcement and intelligence roles.”  DIA under CIA would however eliminate the “wall” that is believed to legally separate foreign intelligence operations from domestic law enforcement activities. 


   CIA
control over DIA would satisfy the “mantra of the post-9/11 world” by facilitating information sharing, however, RAND warned, “there is probably no more controversial choice on the entire spectrum of alternatives than involving the CIA in explicitly domestic counter-terrorism activities.”


   RAND
cautioned, “At a very basic level, public perception of the nature of the CIA’s clandestine operations and the recent controversy regarding extraordinary Rendition and CIA prisons would likely exacerbate public fears regarding potential domestic intelligence abuses.” 


   Further, RAND warned it may be “very difficult” to create a DIA under CIA-control that was transparent enough to address the fears that accompany CIA operations; fears that are “based on historic abuses, semi-current horror stories, and the eternal myths that fill the gap created by secrecy.”


   The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose core mission is to prevent terrorism on U.S. soil, was considered as a third option for a DIA parent-agency, an option that would make a “great deal of sense” according to RAND because DHS was already charged with the function of “combining most efforts on homeland security and preparedness.”


    Further, a DIA under DHS would forge links with other intelligence operations within DHS such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Coast Guard. 


   As a “less entrenched organization,” DHS may be “more adaptable and more resilient in the face of emerging threats than the somewhat rigid post-World War II creations of the FBI and CIA,” suggested RAND.


   In an argument against a DIA subordinated under DHS, the report suggested “failures of the current subunits within DHS, especially the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina, have raised major questions about the department’s effectiveness.”


Privacy & Civil Liberty


   Domestic intelligence collection means more information collected on individuals of interest and individuals “who are not yet of interest but who might be labeled as such if more were known about them,” warned RAND.


   The balance between security and privacy may be measured by the “number of terrorists identified versus the number of innocent people whose personal details are viewed” by government agents. 

 
   RAND
placed a footnote number beside the word “terrorist.”  The footnote provided the reader a definition of “terrorist” as: “shorthand for those in whom the domestic intelligence agency is interested. Some may not, in fact, be terrorists; they may instead be spies, violent revolutionaries, major saboteurs, or the leadership of powerful crime syndicates. That noted, trade-offs that may be reasonable for targets who are terrorists may not be reasonable for other targets.” Emphasis original.


    If a stand-alone DIA were to be created, policies and capabilities would require “explicit consideration” that detailed what private information of Americans would be accessible and what can be done with that information.


Security v. Privacy Dilemma


   RAND
succinctly summed up the dilemma in balancing security and Liberty when it reported, “If, in retrospect, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had learned a great deal about the habits, goings, and comings of Zacarias Moussaoui (convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism), few people would have been terribly upset by the revelation. As a terrorist, it is likely that any complaint he might make that his privacy rights were being violated would not be compelling to most people. If, on the other hand, the FBI gained a similarly detailed knowledge about the habits, goings, and comings of everyone in Minnesota in the effort to find him, the outcry might well be deafening. Virtually no one else in Minnesota is a terrorist, yet information on these people would have been gathered and transferred to the FBI’s storage files. Therein lies the crux of the security-versus-privacy dilemma.”


Gauging Privacy


   Determining exactly how to define privacy presented “one big problem,” and RAND declared the complete review of the legal question was beyond the scope of their study, but added summary observations were necessary.


   RAND
found the Right to privacy was not legally absolute the same way Freedom of speech was since speech was specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights and privacy needed to be “inferred” from the Bill of Rights. 


   First Amendment Rights are Rights “to do” and the Right to privacy is the Right to “keep others from doing (i.e., collecting information on someone).”  Emphasis original.


   RAND
found, “The freedom to speak, once denied, can be restored.  An individual’s privacy, once violated, may well be violated forever, in the sense that the sensitive information, once released, cannot be unreleased.  Largely, therefore, privacy, at least in legal terms, is determined by the courts.”


   What the government has the right to know and what it does not have the right to know should be based upon the reasonable expectation of privacy, where “reasonable  hearkens to the Fourth Amendment’s reference to unreasonable search and seizures.” Emphasis original.


   RAND
found, “For example, for a police officer to overhear and take advantage of something one says in the middle of a police station is not problematic: One has no reasonable expectation of privacy there. Conversely, for a police officer to exploit technology to hear something one says in one’s automobile when the windows are up may well be problematic, because one does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that milieu.”


   That test has practical value, RAND concluded, because it identified zones where citizens can communicate freely and zones where they cannot.  When the distinctions between the zones are “clear” and “make sense,” it could be expected people will self-regulate their behavior, speech and activity.


   The trade-off of privacy for the sake of security has three distinct levels of privacy violation: personal data gathered by computer that is never seen by human analysts has the lowest degree of violation; personal data seen by people but not used in decision making brings a medium level of privacy violation; and personal information used in making decisions about people was described as “particularly problematic” because people “have little opportunity to challenge the data.”


   Based on that analysis, RAND emphasized people and computers should be kept separate, and when data requested by the government was received from “providers (e.g. phone companies)” it should be forwarded to a central stand-alone facility in encrypted form where general and specific profiling algorithms would be employed to uncover any data that suggested an individual’s activity aroused further interest.

RAND concluded the federal government should first weigh whether current domestic counter-terrorism efforts were sufficient before creating a DIA, and just as important, consider whether the American People would support its creation in the first place.


   U.S. Policy-makers were warned that “history and public opinion clearly demonstrate intense sensitivities” among The People when it came to spying on The People by the government.

 

 

 

 



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